von Reinhold Hedtke

Udo Reifner gehört zu den ganz wenigen rechts- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Experten im Feld der Finanzdienstleistungen und Finanzindustrie, die gegenüber der allgegenwärtigen Finanzbildungseuphorie, deren schillernden Drittmittelverlockungen und happigen Honoraren unbeirrt am kritisch-skeptischen Habitus des Wissenschaftlers festhalten. Er prüft immer zuerst, was wir wissenschaftlich wirklich wissen und was dagegen nur cheap talk ist. Das sollte Routine sein, ist es aber nicht. Reifner fragt auch beharrlich und mit nüchternem Blick nach den politischen Hintergründen des anhaltenden Hypes und erforscht die Interessenlagen, die Logik der Begünstigung und Benachteiligung, die beabsichtigten Wirkungen und unbeabsichtigten Nebenfolgen. Geradezu exemplarisch kommt dies im Abschnitt 3, „Dummheit: Finanzielles Analphabetentum“, des Kapitels E „Geld Moral: Schuld, Gier und Dummheit“ im Band 2 seines Werkes „Das Geld: Soziologie des Geldes“ zum Ausdruck. Dazu im Folgenden wenige Anmerkungen.

Nichts- und Wenigwisser

Fangen wir mit etwas besonders Wichtigem an, der Bildung. Immer wieder ist der öffentliche Aufschrei groß, wenn irgendjemand mit irgendeiner Befragung irgendwelche Wissenslücken über finanzielle Dinge bei irgendeiner Bevölkerungsgruppe entdeckt.

Dabei zeigen Wissenstests nur, was man sowieso schon weiß: Die meisten Menschen wissen in fast allen Domänen wenig bis nichts. Die Welt ist bevölkert von Nichtwissern, von mathematischen, physikalischen, juristischen geographischen, geschichtlichen, politischen Analphabeten – und eben auch von finanziellen Nichts- und Wenigwissern.

Versteht jemand den Zinseszins nicht, dann fehlt ihm merkwürdigerweise finanzielle Bildung – und nicht mathematische Bildung. So werden die Selbstverständlichkeiten des Faches Mathematik willkürlich zu Aufgaben einer separaten Finanzbildung falschetikettiert, um deren bildungspolitische Dringlichkeit „nachzuweisen“.
Was solchen alarmistischen Befunden aber immer fehlt, sind zwei Essentials, ohne die eine Debatte über Finanzwissen und Finanzbildung völlig sinnfrei bleibt: Erstens legen sie keine Rechenschaft über die Relevanz des getesteten Wissens ab und zweitens vermeiden sie jeglichen Vergleich zum Wissen in anderen Domänen und dessen Relevanz. So kann man weder sehen, wozu das fehlende Wissen gut sein soll, noch ob das angebliche Nichtwissen ein besonders schwerer Fall oder nur ein weiteres Exempel für die allseits vorhandene Unkenntnis ist.

Das Aufrechterhalten genau dieser beiden Formen des Nichtwissens über Finanzwissen ist aber die Voraussetzung dafür, dass man finanzielle Wissenstests auf einer Skala von unbekümmert bis skrupellos (finanz-)industriepolitisch und bildungspolitisch ausbeuten kann. Über die Optionen, sich auf dem weiten Feld der Finanzbildung institutionell oder persönlich zu bereichern, müssen wir hier schweigen, weil maximal mögliche Intransparenz der Interessenverflechtungen zwischen Finanzindustrie, Wissenschaft und Wissenschaftlern offensichtlich zum branchenüblichen Ethikkodex gehört.

Praktisches Wissen und instrumentelle Kompetenzen

Beim ersten Typ dieser Ausbeutung geht es um eine funktionalistische Umdeutung des Bildungsbegriffs, um einen gesellschaftspolitischen Kampf um die Bedeutung von Bildung. Die sogenannte Finanzbildung dient als exemplarisches Anwendungsfeld für die Strategie, Bildung auf mehr oder weniger praktisches Wissen und instrumentelle Kompetenz zu reduzieren. Beispielhaft verdeutlicht das der Finanzbildungsbegriff des Oldenburger Instituts für Ökonomische Bildung (IÖB):

„Finanzielle Allgemeinbildung bezeichnet den Prozess zur Entwicklung von Finanzkompetenz. Diese wird als Summe von Einstellungen, Motivation, Wertvorstellungen, Kenntnissen, Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten verstanden, die es einem Individuum ermöglichen, sich kompetent und mündig auf dem Finanzdienstleistungsmarkt zu orientieren, es befähigen, seine privaten Finanzen zu organisieren, entsprechend zu handeln und sich an der Analyse und Gestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen des Finanzdienstleistungsbereichs zu beteiligen.“ (Hans Kaminski, Stephan Friebel 2012: Arbeitspapier „Finanzielle Allgemeinbildung als Bestandteil der ökonomischen Bildung. Oldenburg, S. 6).

Das ist ein bemerkenswert bescheidener Bildungsbegriff, der das übliche Bildungsverständnis auf den Kopf stellt: Bildung verkümmert hier zu einem Prozess, der mit Kompetenz als Ergebnis endet. Bildung mutiert so zum Mittel für Kompetenz, eine finanzielle Allgemeinbildung (!) schrumpft zum Instrument für die private Finanzorganisations- und Finanzdienstleistungsmarktkompetenz. Wenn man sich darauf beschränken will – was ja nicht illegitim ist –, muss man das offen und ehrlich benennen, wie es etwa die Stiftung Warentest macht, wenn sie Schulprojekte über „praktisches ökonomisches Wissen rund um Finanzprodukte“ anbietet. Dies als „Finanzbildung“ zu überhöhen, überzeugt nicht.

Wie viel weiter geht dagegen der einschlägige Bildungsanspruch bei Udo Reifner: „Finanzielle Allgemeinbildung müsste Konsumenten die Fähigkeit vermitteln, ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse und Ressourcen zu erkennen, sie in Bezug zu den Möglichkeiten der Bedürfnisbefriedung durch marktmäßige Finanzdienstleistungsangebote zu setzen und bei ihnen Verständnis dafür erzeugen, dass sie ihre Rechte, ihre Marktmacht und politischen Einfluss einsetzen müssen, damit Finanzdienstleistungen für sie einen Nutzen bringen.“ (Reifner, Das Geld, Bd. 2, 129).
Wenn man die Abwertung und Instrumentalisierung von Bildung von Bildung nicht einfach zur Kenntnis nehmen will, muss man sagen können, was denn eine Bildung, die diesen Namen auch verdient, im Themenfeld Finanzen wäre.

Was wäre Bildung?

Bildung, daran ist zunächst festzuhalten, hat etwas mit der Person zu tun, sie betrifft, berührt, bestimmt, vertieft, verändert die Persönlichkeit und verbessert und erweitert nicht nur ihr praktisches Wissen und Können. Dafür reicht der Begriff „Lernen“ völlig aus.

Personale Bildung bezieht sich auf drei Verhältnisse der Person, auf ihre Selbstverhältnisse, Weltverhältnisse und Sozialverhältnisse (vgl. z. B. Winfried Marotzki 1990, Entwurf einer strukturalen Bildungstheorie. Biographietheoretische Auslegung von Bildungsprozessen in hochkomplexen Gesellschaften. Weinheim). In einer Finanzbildung, die tatsächlich Bildung wäre, geht es beispielsweise darum, das eigene Selbstverhältnis zu entwickeln und Fragen zu diskutieren wie z. B.: Was macht Geld mit mir? Wie will, wie soll, wie muss ich mit Geld umgehen? Es geht dann darum, eine eigene Weltorientierung zum Geld aufbauen und Fragen zu reflektieren wie z. B.: Wie funktioniert, was bewirkt Geld in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik? Was ist und wie beurteile ich die „Finanzialisierung“ der Wirtschaft und meines Alltagslebens? Kann und will ich das so lassen oder ändern? Und es geht um das Nachdenken über die eigenen Sozialverhältnisse mit Fragen wie z. B.: Was bedeutet Geld für meine persönlichen, beruflichen und gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen? Kann und will ich die gesellschaftlichen Geldverhältnisse in konkreten Kontexten oder im politischen Raum ändern? Wo finde ich Verbündete dafür? Wo stehen die Gegner?

Diese Fragen spielen in der herrschenden Vorstellung von Finanzbildung (fast) keine Rolle. Was kann man daran sehen?

Funktionalistische Umdeutung von Bildung

Wir befinden uns mitten in einem grundsätzlichen Deutungskampf um Bildung, Denkweisen und Weltbilder. Er lässt sich durchaus als der vielgestaltige Versuch einer neoliberalen Umwertung der Werte und einer freiwilligen Selbstunterwerfung unter die vorgeblichen „Gesetze“ „der“ Marktwirtschaft und „der“ Märkte verstehen. Bildung dagegen birgt Reflexion, Distanz und Widerständigkeit. Bildung setzt stärker auf den Citoyen, als auf den Bourgeois. Diese Bildung aber stört das reibungslose Funktionieren als Kunde auf Märkten. Auch deshalb wird Bildung umgedeutet zu funktionalistisch gewendeter Kompetenz. Als Kompetenz gilt das, was messbar ist. Was man nicht messen kann, zählt nicht. Funktionieren wird wichtiger als Bilden. Finanzbildung verschwindet, Finanzerziehung macht sich breit.

Vor diesem Hintergrund überrascht es nicht, dass wir zahlreiche Vorstöße zur ökonomistischen Umprogrammierung des Denkens der Individuen erleben. Genannt seien hier nur Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship Education und Employability Education. In diesen Ansätzen verdrängen die Instrumentalisierung des Individuums für wirtschaftspolitische Zwecke und die instrumentell motivierte Wissensvermittlung persönliche, sachlich fundierte Reflexion, etwa über grundsätzliche Fragen: Wie sehe ich mich jetzt und zukünftig in der Wirtschaft? Wie will ich mein wirtschaftliches Leben gestalten? In welches Verhältnis will ich mich zum Geld setzen?

Wenn alles Wissen und Können sowie jegliches Lernen unterschiedslos als „Bildung“ ausgezeichnet wird, dann tritt funktionalistische Gleichmacherei an die Stelle von sorgfältiger Differenzierung der Begriffe und des Begreifens. Selbstverständlich braucht Bildung Wissen und Können, sonst bleibt sie leer. Aber wie viel mehr „Bildung“ bedeutet, wie sehr sich „Bildung“ von ihrem ökonomistisch-funktionalistischem Zerrbild in der so genannten Finanzbildung un-terscheidet, bringt der Schweizer Philosoph Peter Bieri treffend zum Ausdruck:
„Bildung ist etwas, das Menschen mit sich und für sich machen: Man bildet sich. Ausbilden können uns andere, bilden kann sich jeder nur selbst. […] Eine Ausbildung durchlaufen wir mit dem Ziel, etwas zu können. Wenn wir uns dagegen bilden, arbeiten wir daran, etwas zu werden – wir streben danach, auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise in der Welt zu sein.“ (Peter Bieri, Wie wäre es, gebildet zu sein? In: Göppel, Rolf; Lenhart, Volker; Rihm, Thomas; Schön, Bär-bel; Strittmatte-Haubold, Veronika, Hrsg., Bildung ist mehr. Heidelberg 2008, S. 13).

Wer die Unterscheidung von Lernen und Bilden, Ausbildung und Bildung gegen die allgegenwärtigen Nivellierer schützen will, der muss konsequent den Begriff Finanzausbildung, Finanzwissen oder Finanzlernen für fast alles verwenden, was sich fälschlicherweise unter dem überhöhten Begriff Finanzbildung oder gar Finanzielle Allgemeinbildung versammelt. Das wäre wenigstens schon mal ein Beitrag zu mehr Klarheit und würde das vielfach eingeklagte Finanzwissen und -können auf dem Niveau verorten, auf das es gehört. Dann kann man auch sinnvoll darüber sprechen, was denn eine Finanzbildung wäre, die die Bezeichnung Bildung auch wirklich verdient. Wie gesagt, Wissen und Können gehört schon dazu, reicht aber nicht.

Finanzindustrielle Instrumentalisierung von „Bildung“

„Bildung ist der beste Anlegerschutz!“ Besser als mit diesem Statement des österreichischen Börsenvorstands Christoph Boschan kann man den zweiten Typ, die branchenpolitische Ausbeutung des viel beklagten finanziellen Nichtwissens, kaum auf den Punkt bringen. Dass dies kein bizarrer Einzelfall ist, belegen ähnliche Formulierungen vom österreichischen Sparkassentag. Die finanzindustrielle Interessenlage findet in der Forderung „Mehr Finanzbildung und weniger Regulatorik!“ einen geradezu klassischen Ausdruck.

Udo Reifner ordnet diese Art von Denkmuster als „weitere Subjektivierung der Kapitalismuskritik“ ein und stellt dazu lakonisch fest: „Der Markt ist gut, die Menschen sind nur nicht ausreichend in der Lage, seine Vorteile zu genießen. Sie sind einfach ausgedrückt zu dumm für den Markt. Aus den strukturellen Defiziten des Geldsystems wird eine individuelle Unfähigkeit der Menschen, dieses Geldsystem adäquat zu benutzen“ (Reifner, Das Geld, Bd. 2, 128f.).

Der Unterschied zum Mainstream der Wirtschaftsdidaktik und der Wirtschaftspädagogik könnte kaum größer sein: Deren ideologische, interessenpolitische (und finanzielle?) Nähe zur Finanzindustrie zeigt sich in der fast völligen Abwesenheit von Kritik an deren Interessen an Finanzerziehung – und in der hartnäckigen Weigerung, sich zuvörderst für die Interessen und die Bildung der Jugendlichen einzusetzen.

Bildung für die Anleger, Privilegien für die Finanzindustrie

Die eben zitierten Statements finanzindustrieller Interessenvertreter sind absurd zynisch zu-gleich. Das verdeutlicht ein rascher Vergleich. Man erinnere sich nur kurz daran, mit welchem Nachdruck global agierende Konzerne für ihre Investitionen und Anlagen von den Regierungen im Zuge der Verhandlungen um internationale Handelsabkommen einen umfassenden Schutz verlangten und verlangen – und wie sehr die Regierungen bereit waren und sind, genau das zu liefern.

Man rufe sich auch in Erinnerung, dass auch die Finanzindustrie eine Sondergerichtsbarkeit mit speziellen internationalen Schiedsgerichten für ihren Anlegerschutz fordert und sich keineswegs mit dem Rechtsweg der normalen nationalen und internationalen Judikative für jedermann zufriedengibt. Man bedenke, dass sie für sich als institutionelle Anleger besonderen Schutz verlangen, obwohl sie laufend auf umfangreiche, hochprofessionelle und organisierte Expertise zurückgreifen können und obwohl sie in der Rolle von Experten und Lobbyisten einen privilegierten Zugang zu Regierungen und politischen Parteien haben.

Dagegen sollen die privaten, schlecht informierten, unprofessionellen und den Finanzprodukteanbietern notorisch unterlegenen Gelegenheitsanleger ihre geringfügigen Anlagen nur mit Mitteln der Bildung schützen! So verhöhnt man die Kleininvestorin und ignoriert ihre objektive Situation und Interessenlagen. Eine Finanzbildung, die den Namen auch nur im Ansatz verdient, bedeutet sozioökonomische und politische Aufklärung über solche Interessenstrukturen und politischen Strategien der Finanzindustrie. Das aber ist mit der so genannten Finanzbildung in aller Regel nicht gemeint. Aufklärung? Fehlanzeige!

Wenig wirtschaftliches Wissen

Aber nicht nur um die politisch-ökonomische Ethik, sondern auch um die ökonomische Bildung der finanzindustriellen Führungskräfte scheint es schlecht bestellt zu sein. Anscheinend verfügen sie nicht über einschlägige wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Kompetenzen, nutzen sie nicht oder sprechen nicht darüber. Ökonomen jedenfalls setzen bekanntlich mehrheitlich nicht auf Umerziehung von Einzelpersonen, um die Wirtschaftswelt zu verbessern, sondern sie empfehlen meist angemessene Regeln und Institutionen, Transparenz und Kontrolle, Anreize und Sanktionen und vor allem klare Haftung für die Folgen der eigenen Entscheidungen. Nebenbei bemerkt: Die Finanzkrise hat eindrücklich demonstriert, dass das Haftungsprinzip für die Finanzindustrie – jedenfalls in Krisen, also dann, wenn es darauf ankommt – aus guten oder schlechten Gründen weitgehend außer Kraft gesetzt und durch die Haftung von Staat und Gesellschaft ersetzt wird.

Auch Verhaltensökonomen und Wirtschaftspsychologen erwarten wenig Wirkung vom Wissen auf das tatsächliche Handeln von individuellen Akteuren. So gab beispielsweise der Verhaltensökonomen Dan Ariely einem Buch den Titel: „Denken nützt zwar, hilft aber wenig. Warum wir immer wieder unvernünftige Entscheidungen treffen“ (2008). Die Ökonomen George A. Akerlof und Robert J. Shiller titelten bekanntlich „animal spirits – Wie Wirtschaft wirklich funktioniert“ (2009). Die Verhaltensökonomik zeigt empirisch, dass animal spirits und unvernünftige Entscheidungen insbesondere bei Geld und Finanzentscheidungen greifen.
Wir wissen, dass man mit individueller Finanzbildung wenig bis gar nichts gegen Komplexität und Überforderung ausrichten kann, beide nehmen schneller zu, als man mit dem schulischen Wissenserwerb hinterherkommen kann. Eins aber ist sicher: Die falsche Sicherheit des Halbwissens nützt der Finanzindustrie. Auch darauf hat Udo Reifner hingewiesen: Wer mit Finanzprodukten vertraut gemacht wurde, nimmt Finanzdienstleistungen „sogar unbekümmerter und mit weniger Zurückhaltung“ in Anspruch als die, die nicht informiert wurden. Solche selbstsicher-scheinkompetenten Kunden dürften ein besonders lukratives Publikum für die Finanzindustrie sein.

Von der Finanzerziehung zur Finanzbildung

Wie dünn und ambivalent die empirische Evidenz für die Effekte von Finanzerziehung ist, zeigt die US-amerikanische Wissenschaftlerin Lauren E. Willis, Rechtswissenschaftlerin wie Udo Reifner, in einem luziden Review-Essay „Finance-Informed Citizens, Citizen-Informed Finance“ im Journal of Social Science Education (Heft 4-2017). Finanzerziehung hat sehr geringe Auswirkungen auf den finanziellen Wohlstand derer, die sie genossen haben.

Sie belegt, dass die Finanzerziehung nicht auch eine politische Aufgabe erfüllt: sie verschweigt die krasse und wachsende finanzielle Ungleichheit und tut so, als sei jeder und jede seines und ihres finanziellen Glückes Schmied. Willis betont: “Teaching people money management skills, when done within a context of understanding that these skills are required only because some societies today have adopted social and regulatory policies that in turn make these skills necessary, can illuminate the fairness or unfairness, efficiency or inefficiency, and wisdom or absurdity of those policies.”

Was auf der Agenda steht, etwa der bildungspolitisch höchst einflussreichen OECD, ist die finanzielle Umerziehung (financial re-education) der Bevölkerung. Mit bildungspolitische Strategien und finanzindustrielle Kampagnen sollen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger auf Investorenmentalität umgepolt werden, sie sollen als unternehmerisches Selbst in den Finanzkapitalismus integriert werden. Die private kapitalmarktorientierte Altersvorsorge befördert Individualisierung und Eigeninteresse statt Solidarität und kollektive Lösungen.
Der reduzierte Bildungsbegriff befördert die Umprogrammierung auf instrumentalistisches Denken. Zugleich trägt die verkürzte Finanzerziehung wesentlich zur Verdunkelung der politischen Hintergründe, der finanzindustriellen Interessenlagen und der Finanzindustriepolitik bei.

Geht es dagegen um vertiefte Finanzbildung statt um verflachte Finanzerziehung, dann kommen grundlegendere Fragen zur Sprache. Die Jugendlichen lernen dann, so Lauren Willis, “how various societies at various times have employed diverse approaches to the support of people past working-age, she will have the opportunity to appreciate the tradeoffs among different policy choices”. In der Finanzbildung geht dann es um politische Alternativen, die Jugendlichen überwinden die Borniertheit des Bourgeois und nehmen mit der Souveränität des Citoyen die finanziellen Verhältnisse der Gesellschaft in den Blick und in die Hand. „Financial education must impress upon students their responsibility and their power to affect, through political actions, society’s financial order.” Neu zu ordnen sind dann weniger die persönlichen Finanzverhältnisse, als die Verhältnisse von Finanzindustrie und Finanzialisierung. Finanzbildung ist zuallererst politische Bildung.

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Der Beitrag „Mehr Finanzbildung und weniger Regulatorik!“ Über die ökonomische, politische und ideologische Funktionalisierung von Bildung erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

by Geraint Howells

The invitation to write this blog gave me an excuse to look at some old books on my shelf. This essay appeared in the last century. What struck me was that the essay reflected how political and economic ideas had shifted the debating starting points so far that it was impossible to imagine anything other than a liberal market oriented framework at that time. All the “left” could do was to re-orientate the debate somewhat, but was forced to mimic the language of neo-liberal economics. In contrast Udo asserts that the law has (and has more potential to) become more liberal and ensure community values are protected. So, strangely, the traditionally conservative legal institutions responded by ensuring the social values were not eroded entirely.

This is not quite the same as the toothpaste analogy regarding discretion, whereby discretion is just pushed around the landscape. There was certainly less social welfare values in society, but the law at least ensured some community welfarist values were entertained as part of the mix. In the UK one saw a similar pattern. When I was a student the judges were the focus of the left’s resentment and Prof Griffith’s book the Politics of the Judiciary showed how they represented a conservative agenda. Actually this was for the most part an individualistic agenda fighting against collectivist solutions, such as the closed shop in the work place. In fact at a time when the judiciary is seen as a valuable resource by the left, I still detect they favour individual rights over collective rights. Often this is dressed upon as human rights arguments to protect individuals against the state as it tries to find collective solutions to rationing scarce resources.

Since Udo’s “Lost Penny” paper was written, we have had the 2008 economic crisis. This seems to have provided scope for some commentators from the left to re-open new political and economic arguments, but sadly has for the most part given rise to fear and protectionism as the capitalist economic and social order seeks to shore up its institutions to allow business to continue as usual. There have undoubtedly been important legal innovations, especially in the field of law Udo specializes in – consumer credit. Responsible lending is not quite here yet as a fully fledged principle in European law, but information duties are made more active with the duty to provide adequate explanations and in some contexts businesses have to take into account the needs of consumers. Major financial crises, such as the housing market collapse in Spain and problems of using foreign currency loans when the Swiss franc increased in value, were resolved by the European Courts using unfair terms legislation in innovative manners. They retrospectively cleaned up the mess – as Udo quoted “da mihi facta dabo tibi ius’(Give me the Fact, I give you the law). However, I am a bit surprised that Udo has such faith in the private law. He always teases me about the conservatism of the common law. Sometimes I think that is unfair, but more generally even in a system with a broad good faith doctrine and rules to intervene in contracts by  interpretation or use of judicial discretion, I think there are limits on the extent to which private law as traditionally understood can assist. Udo himself quotes a case that said the character of oranges was not affected by the human rights abuses of the country exporting them. At a far more pragmatic level the costs of litigation are so high (in terms not only of money but also effort) that few people litigate. Class actions have not normally been taken to protect the collective interest in matters such as the environment, but rather the collected individual losses of individuals in the financial services sector or those who paid too much in the UK for replica football shirts.

Udo notes the potential for contracts to become a place for the creation of legal rights. I see soft law Codes and guidance having an important role and public authorities (in some countries consumer organisations) having great practical impact.

I was always told you needed a good title to grab the reader’s attention and make him or her remember the paper. Udo is always excellent at doing this. This time he uses a religion parable about a Lost Penny. His point is that the market is neutral and you have to ensure community values have a value in the market place. However, he does go on to suggest that money is becoming less anonymous given the ability to trace it electronically. We also have to be cautious about the neutrality of market exchanges as some studies show discrimination exists as the same deal is not provided to all regardless of their characteristics. This has been suggested to be the case based on wealth, colour or sex, but nowadays can be based on your internet browsing habits.

This article reflects some of the real strength of Udo’s work. He has a deep breadth of knowledge about law, politics, economics and philosophy. He challenges traditional perceptions from a position of intellectual strength and places legal discussion in a real world context. In other aspects of his professional life he has delivered meaningful practical benefits to consumers and citizens. That practical approach is reflected in his willingness to use the instruments that already exist in creative ways to benefit the community. He remains a forceful advocate of consumer values in a world that embraces consumerism, but not always consumer values of the sort Udo espouses. If there were more people, like Udo, willing to challenge established viewpoints in the courts then the world would be a better place and private law could fulfil the potential Udo has revealed to us.

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Der Beitrag The Lost Penny erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

by Iain Ramsay

Udo Reifner has been an inspiration in promoting the ideal of a finance for citizens and productive credit system. He has made a great contribution to international thinking and policy making in the EU on financial services. His many collaborative research projects at the IFF since 1987 have maintained an important critical perspective on developments in personal finance. Udo’s work is imaginative and rich in ideas, which have often stimulated others. In this blog, I focus primarily on his work on responsible credit, and overindebtedness, and the principles established by the European Coalition on Responsible Credit founded in 2006.

Since the Great Recession of 2008, triggered by problems in sub-prime mortgage markets in the US, an international paradigm change has taken place in the approach to the regulation of consumer credit. Concepts such as responsible credit, applicable throughout the life of a credit contract, have become embedded in international soft law documents. Many ideas in this paradigm were foreshadowed by Udo who before the recession outlined fundamental principles of responsible credit.((Discussed in ‘A Call to Arms’—For Regulation of Consumer Lending’ in J Niemi, I Ramsay & W Whitford, Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy (Oxford, Hart, 2009) chapter 6.)) These were underpinned by the idea that credit was essential for full participation in society, and must be affordable for all. Credit should be productive for the borrower: credit relations should be transparent and understandable; lending should be cautious, responsible and fair: credit contracts should adapt to changes in circumstances; protective legislation has to be effective; overindebtedness should be a matter of public concern and bankruptcy should lead to rehabilitation; borrowers must have adequate means to defend their rights and be free to voice their concerns.

At the time of formulation of these principles the EU was about to finalise its Directive on consumer credit which, under the pressure of financial institutions operating through their respective governments, had watered down the responsible lending principle and envisaged a Directive driven primarily by an interest in market expansion rather than regulatory protection. Neoliberal ideas seemed dominant. Policies such as interest rate ceilings were regarded as old-fashioned, blunt, and ineffective methods of market regulation. Ironically the Directive came into effect a few weeks before the demise of Lehman brothers, initiating the largest downturn in the world economy since the Depression of the 1930s.

Commentators on credit often divide narratives of credit regulation into those which emphasise access and those which emphasise protection. The dominant international narrative pre-2008 was that of access to credit, albeit subject to consumer protection measures which promoted confidence in the market. Early work by the World Bank in central Europe focused on promoting credit bureaux, truth in lending, financial literacy and financial ombudsmen, institutions intended to construct a neo-liberal credit subject for the newly developing credit markets in those countries.((See e.g. early draft of World Bank Good Practices, ‘Good Practices for Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Europe and Central Asia (2008).))

Udo critiqued the increasingly neoliberal approaches to consumer credit protection where ‘the debtor must learn to adapt to the market’, arguing that consumer credit regulation must recognise the relational nature of credit contract, the structural causes of overindebtedness and the inevitably redistributive nature of consumer credit regulation.

The European Coalition for Responsible Credit principles promote both access and protection throughout the life of the credit contract. They recognise that credit is ‘essential for full participation in society’ but that credit relations should be ‘productive’. Udo argues that this requires responsible credit, but it might also raise broader macroeconomic questions about the optimal level of consumer credit in a society, a theme taken up by Adair Turner in 2015, arguing that many contemporary economies produce both too much and also the wrong types of credit.((See e.g. early draft of World Bank Good Practices, ‘Good Practices for Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Europe and Central Asia (2008).))

The Great Recession had a major effect on international thinking about household credit. The Financial Stability Board in 2010 reported on consumer credit, emphasising the importance of responsible lending, strengthened oversight agencies, and established the international organisation FINCONET to steer national initiatives. The OECD developed international principles for financial consumer protection including responsible business conduct and fair treatment of consumers. The World Bank indicates in a 2017 survey that 90 percent of jurisdictions have controls on excessive borrowing, intended to give effect to the OECD principle of fair treatment of consumers.((See e.g. early draft of World Bank Good Practices, ‘Good Practices for Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Europe and Central Asia (2008).)) The EU Mortgage Credit Directive (2014), which before 2008 had been wending its way through the EU legislative process with a market expansion mission, was substantially changed to include tougher rules on irresponsible lending and greater controls on the supply side of the market. The European Court of Justice intervened in several credit cases to nudge member states towards higher ground rules on mortgage foreclosure procedures.

Interest rate ceilings remain a controversial method of regulation. Udo and others in a comprehensive report for the EU tested several hypotheses concerning the effects of ceilings with results which indicated the complexity of issues surrounding their role. Thus, while ceilings might limit access to high risk consumers little evidence existed that individuals would turn to illegal money lenders.((‘Study on interest rate restrictions in the EU Final Report’, U Reifner, S Clerc-Renaud, RA Michael Knobloch (2010) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/irr_report_en.pdf.)) The UK traditionally eschewed ceilings but in a significant volte-face, the Financial Conduct Authority introduced ceilings for short term high cost loans in 2015, based on careful cost-benefit analysis which indicated that the costs of payday loans to certain high risk consumers outweighed their benefits. The FCA later found in a review of the effects of ceilings almost no evidence that individuals were substituting for lack of access by using illegal money lenders.

An important aspect of Udo’s research has addressed the treatment of overindebtedness in the EU and his 2003 report with Nik Huls, Johanna Niemi and Helga Springeneeer, provides a template for the European regulation of over-indebtedness, focusing on the importance of the fresh start, public debt counselling and advice, and rehabilitation of the debtor.((‘Consumer Overindebtedness and Consumer Law in the European Union’ Udo Reifner, Johanna Kiesilainen, Nik Huls, Helga Springeneer (2003) at http://www.knl.lv/raksti_data/1147/parskats_ES_2003.pdf.))

Udo gradually moved towards the position that the long-term nature of credit relations, where individuals are borrowing for many basic needs against future income, required methods of adapting to interruptions in income which draw on extended ideas of force majeure. Overindebtedness is an ‘integral part of the credit society’((Reifner, n1,107.)) requiring forms of adaptation over time which responds to the needs of consumers. These ideas remain to be fully developed but they provide a direction for future research and also pose difficult questions about credit in contemporary societies where credit may be supplementing income in a model of ‘loans for wages’ with some consumers paying a high price for credit.

Ten years after the Great Recession many may be forgetting the pre-crisis scandals of payment protection insurance in the UK, the Dexia scandal in the Netherlands, or the details of the sub-prime mortgage scandal in the US. Indeed, in the US, the Trump administration seems set on dismantling the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, established in the wake of the crisis to ensure greater safety for financial products. The political battle for meaningful responsible credit norms continues.

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Der Beitrag Responsible Credit and the European Coalition for Responsible Credit erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

by Thomas Wilhelmsson

The editors of this commemorative publication to celebrate Udo Reifner on his 70^th birthday have given the contributors a very difficult task. Each one of us is to choose one or a few of Udo’s texts to comment on or review. We all know the immense breadth of his work, spanning from consumer law issues relating to, e.g., consumer credit, consumer advice and life time contracts to broad analyses of the role and function of money, not to forget the interesting discussions on the law of the Third Reich. The difficulty of the choice is enhanced by the fact that these analyses are usually both deep and very original.

In this abundance of interesting texts I have decided to go back to the roots, and write some comments on Udo’s first large (476 pages) monography Alternatives Wirtschaftsrecht am Beispiel der Verbraucherverschuldung (Alternative Economic Law, as Exemplified by Consumer Indebtedness).((Reifner, Udo. Alternatives Wirtschaftsrecht am Beispiel der Verbraucherverschuldung: Realitätsverleugnung oder soziale Auslegung im Zivilrecht. Luchterhand, 1979.))  There are several reasons why I think this old work, from 1979, should still be devoted some attention.

Already the fact that this work gives a first expression of Udo’s interest in many of the issues and perspectives that he has been developing throughout his academic and practical life makes it impossible to ignore it in a commemorative publication. The number of citations in both German and international legal discourse also shows that this work has not passed unnoticed.((Already Google Scholar notes 38 references, by many well-known authors.))

However, I also have a personal reason for choosing to write a comment on this book. It has influenced my own legal thinking((You will find several references to Udo’s book in my Critical studies in private law: A treatise on need-rational principles in modern law. Law and philosophy library Vol. 16. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992.)) and it has had an impact on Finnish legal theoretical and dogmatic discourse. In addition, this discourse has been noted in legal research in the other Nordic countries as well.

In the beginning of the eighties at the University of Helsinki we had established a discussion group of academics and other lawyers regularly convening around issues relating to alternative ways of doing private law research. Together we studied both classics like Karl Renner, Otto Kahn-Freund and Morton Horwitz, but also many at that time contemporary writers, like P.S. Atiyah,((Atiyah, Patrick Selim. The rise and fall of freedom of contract. Vol. 61. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.)) Gunther Teubner((Teubner, Gunther. „Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law.“ Law and society review (1983): 239-285.)) and Roberto Mangabeira Unger,((Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. „The critical legal studies movement.“ Harvard law review (1983): 561-675.)) to mention some of the authors who had much impact on the following discussions. Among the works of these renowned scholars Udo’s book was one of the first we chose for scrutiny, and the discussion we had was very inspiring. I could still find in my archives the old type-written manuscript of Jyrki Tala((Then Councellor of Legislation at the Ministry of Justice, responsible for drafting i.a. consumer protection legislation (later professor at The University of Turku).)) who was entrusted to present the work on our occasion on Wednesday 31^st of March 1982.

Remembering a good seminar evening 35 years ago is not a sufficient reason for returning to a book published almost 40 years ago. The impact and continuing topicality of the book is. So why did we find the book so inspiring and what ideas seem valuable even from today’s perspective?

One feature which is fascinating already in this book, and in many later writings by Udo, is the successful combination of theory and practice. This is certainly one trademark of his production, a feature that strongly contributes to its originality. In Alternatives Wirtschaftsrecht Udo’s starting point is a deep and fundamental theoretical critique of the private law system. But the story does not end at the fundamental critique. It goes on to formulate, on the basis of this critique and a more concrete critical analysis of the topic of consumer indebtedness, concrete conclusions concerning a new interpretation of private law as well as a sketch for new legislation on consumer credit. The practical consequences of the theory are spelled out in detail, to be used in legal practice. It is well known that Udo did not even stop here, offering practical solutions for others to implement. Through his Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen (IFF) he was for many years himself practically engaged in improving the position of consumers on the credit market.

The fundamental critique (prinzipielle Kritik) that is the starting point of his analysis is based on a recognition of two fundamental contradictions within and behind the modern civil law system. These contradictions express a tension between traditional basic elements of the system and new societal structures. The first contradiction is the one between on the one hand an ideal-type of civil law that expresses power based on the private ownership of the means of production and exercised thorough an exchange between equal and free individuals, and on the other hand an increasingly social nature of production that requires more planning and control. Or phrased in a shorter form: there is a tension between the individualism of private law and the increasing need for a social regulation of production. Udo’s second contradiction again relates to the conflict between a civil law that represents minority interests and a growing political pressure from general societal interests.

As mentioned, Udo brings this general critique to a concrete legal level as well, through a critique that he calls symptomatic (symptomatische Kritik). The symptomatic critique is based on a concrete legal analysis of elements in law that brings to the fore the contradictions revealed by the fundamental critique. This critique makes it possible to replace the formal interpretation of civil law with a social interpretation (soziale Auslegung) that is able to analyze relevant social relationships and bring into the legal assessment also such interests that were not accepted before.

The contradictions within law and between law and society can be described in many ways. The basic idea that makes this approach “alternative”, however, is not the descriptions of the contradictions as such, but the fact that the existence of contradictions is made the starting point for legal reasoning. Whilst “traditional” legal dogmatics tends to view contradictions as anomalies, Udo views them as vehicles to create a new legal approach, a social interpretation. In this sense he works within a similar paradigm as many others interested in alternative legal dogmatics, such as the critical legal studies movement in the US, and the uso alternativo del diritto in Italy. And this is the route some of the discourse on alternative legal studies has taken in Finland and the Nordic countries as well. I personally think that precisely this emphasis on law’s internal contradictions is the most prominent distinguishing feature when trying to picture what is “alternative” in so called alternative legal dogmatics.

The emphasis on the basic contradictions leads research to focus on the conceptual and systematic structure of law. The researcher is led to question why certain parts of legal reasoning are usually described as operationalizing established general principles and main rules, whilst others are deemed to play the role of exceptions that should be interpreted narrowly. Realising that the established conceptual structure is not the only possible, one might even picture the core of law as an eternal struggle between main rules and exceptions. Legal dogmatics plays an important, sometimes even decisive role in this struggle. What alternative dogmatics does, in general terms, is demanding a kind of “switching of the principles”, a change of places between main rules and exceptions, to the extent this is socially justifiable.

But there is, of course, a difficult challenge connected with such a project. The switching of the principles is no end in itself, but needs to be justified socially, as just noted. Personally I think these choices cannot be made using only criteria from within the law, but the choice is ultimately politico-moral. Therefore alternative dogmatics cannot, without betraying its own starting points, claim that its resystematisation has a different and stronger truth value than the traditional systematisations. It can only offer a new possible approach leaving the final choice to the decision-maker. Needless to say, such anchorage of the final outcome in “decisionism” can be and has been criticised.

To be fair, Udo’s analysis does not appear as “decisionist” in this sense. When the alternative forms of legal dogmatics were discussed in the 1970s and 1980s a firmer vision was indeed possible. These were the times when the welfare state still was advancing. For a future-directed law it was natural to claim that the elements of welfarism in private law were expressions of the new thinking towards which society was heading. Therefore it seemed possible “objectively” to found the demand for an alternative dogmatics on the new societal situation and its normative claims. Today this continuing advancement towards more welfarism is (unfortunately) history, and even those defending the welfarist achievements have to take decisions whether to rely on an openly social paradigm or defend the achieved results in a more traditionalist manner. There is no generally accepted grand narrative of the welfare state in the condition that some prefer to call postmodern.

That, however, makes the recognition of the contradictions of various kinds within the legal system even more topical and important. There is much to be learned also for contemporary discourse from Udo’s fundamental and symptomatic critique of private law.

In the symptomatic critique Udo discusses, among other issues, the question whether certain social reasons for a debtor’s failure to perform may be taken into account in the legal assessment of the situation.((p. 291 et seq.)) In Udo’s social interpretation a debtor who fails to pay in time because of lack of means due to his unemployment, short-time work, illness, strike or other similar occurrences cannot be said to have acted negligently as required by the BGB. Therefore such a debtor cannot be charged with sanctions related to the delay. Needless to say, most German writers did not embrace this new interpretation.((Concerning the discussion, see, e.g., Hörmann, Günter. Verbraucher und Schulden: eine rechtstatsächliche und rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur Schuldbeitreibung und Schuldenregulierung bei privaten Haushalten. Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 1987, p. 84.)) Neither was Udo’s proposal for a section with this content((p. 432.)) in a new consumer credit act followed. Such a proposal, based inter alia on Udo’s work, was discussed at the German lawyer’s meeting, but was rejected.((Verhandlungen des 53. Juristentages, Berlin 1980, Band II. München, 1980, p K 247, K 251.))

But again, these ideas still have an impact on the European debate on what is nowadays often called social force majeure. More or less at the same time that Udo was presenting his ideas, but independently, there were some cases on social force majeure decided in the Swedish Market Court, and the Finnish legislator enacted an interesting Act on Interest. It contains an express provision according to which a consumer can claim adjustment of his liability to pay interest for delay, if the delay was caused by payment difficulties which the consumer had encountered mainly through no fault of his own in consequence of illness, unemployment or some other special cause. In the following Finnish and Nordic discussions concerning the development of a principle of social force majeure, switching from exception to principle, also the work of Udo was cited. And in contemporary European private law discourse one can still find occasional interest in the concept of social force majeure.

Udo’s reasoning was not only based on empirical evidence. It also emerged from a conception of consumer in which consumption and production were not understood as opposites. Udo rather wanted to connect the position of consumer to the position of employee and see consumption primarily as a means of reproduction of the workforce.((p. 19-20.)) In such a perspective it seemed natural that a debtor who had lost his income as an employee could not be accused of having negligently left his consumer credit unpaid. This broad perspective on the position of the individual in the social structures, combining various roles as, e.g., consumer, tenant and employee, has remained an important feature also in Udo’s later works. Recently he has contributed in a very interesting way to the European contract law discourse through a project on social long-term contracts in labour, tenancy and consumer credit law.((Nogler, Luca, and Udo Reifner. Life time contracts: social long-term contracts in labour, tenancy and consumer credit law. Eleven International Publishing, 2014.))

In this short paper I have attempted to show that Udo’s early work on Alternatives Wirtschaftsrecht is topical and thought-provoking also for a contemporary reader. And I do hope that these ideas will find readers also in the future. There is still need for a discourse on social interpretation of private law in Europe.

My sincere congratulations, Udo!

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Der Beitrag Alternative Economic Law: Challenging the Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

von Karl-Jürgen Bieback

Als Arbeits- und Sozialrechtler bin ich das erste Mal und dann für mich auch gleich sehr nachhaltig auf ein wissenschaftliches Referat Udo Reifners auf der Tagung 1979 der Vereinigung für Rechtssoziologie gestoßen. Udo Reifner referierte dort zum Thema „Verbraucherverschuldung und Arbeitslosigkeit – Soziale Problematik und zivilrechtliche Bewertung“. Udos Arbeit stammt aus seinem großen Tätigkeitsfeld am WZB in Berlin zum Konsumentenkredit, Verbraucherschutz und Privatinsolvenz. Bei einigen Rechtssoziologen zivilrechtlicher Provenienz stieß Udo Reifners Vortrag auf krasse, pauschale Ablehnung. Das hatte mich damals sehr erstaunt. Denn zumindest bei den Rechtssoziologen hatte ich mir mehr rationalen Diskurs, sachliche Arbeit am Detail wie an den Großargumenten des Rechts erhofft.

Für mich war und ist der Artikel ein gutes Beispiel für jene Art rechtssoziologischer und rechtsdogmatischer Analyse, die nicht nur fragt, wie das Recht in der Praxis angewandt wird und wie die Praxis auf das Recht zurückwirkt, sondern die auch die Offenheit und Ambivalenzen zentraler Rechtsbegriffe und Argumentationsfiguren deutlich macht, und das mit guten Gründen. Bis in dieses Jahrhundert hinein habe ich den Aufsatz in zwei Lehrveranstaltungen verwandt: Vor allem im Kurs zur Methodenlehre, sodann auch in Projekten und Kursen zum Arbeitsmarktrecht.

Was machte und macht diesen Text aus?

Einmal enthält er im ersten Teil (I) eine sehr solide, faktenreiche sozio-ökonomische Analyse, weshalb abhängig Beschäftigte Konsumenten- und Ratenkredite aufnehmen müssen. Und damit entzieht der Artikel dem vorherrschenden Vorurteil (auch des bildungsbürgerlichen Milieus, aus dem die meisten an der Universität kommen) die Basis, die Unterschicht sei doch selber schuld an ihrem Elend, sie müsse sich eben mit dem bescheiden was sie hat und sie müsse nicht auf die plumpen Verführungen der Handelskonzerne in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Finanzkapital hereinfallen. Die Darlegungen zur Verschiebung des notwendigen Konsums hin zu teuren, langlebigen Konsumgütern, der Entwicklung der Haushaltsbudgets und dem Auseinanderklaffen von Konsumperiode (langfristig) und Einkommensperiode (monatlich, unsicher) entzieht dem jede Basis. Hinzu kommt, dass sich eine monatliche Ratenzahlung nicht mehr kalkulierbar in das 20-fache und mehr verwandelt, wenn mit dem Verzug von eine oder zwei Raten das ganze Darlehen fällig wird. Das macht die „normale“ Reproduktion der Arbeitnehmer prekäre, was hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, die in der Regel zu Zahlungsschwierigkeiten arbeitsloser Arbeitnehmer führt, erst richtig deutlich wird. Das sind Risiken, die nicht der Sphäre individueller Beliebigkeit der Konsumenten zuzurechnen sind, sondern die „systemisch“ mit den modernen Reproduktionsbedingungen und dem Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit zusammenhängen und mitnichten durch den Lohnersatz der Arbeitslosenversicherung abgedeckt werden aber sozialstaatlich bearbeitet werden müssen. Für Sozialrechtler eine wichtige, vom Sozialrecht übersehene Dimension.

Zum zweiten enthält der Aufsatz (unter II) dann eine grundlegende Kritik zentraler juristischer/zivilrechtlicher Dogmen, die unhinterfragt dem Schuldrecht („Geld muss man haben“), ja dem Recht insgesamt („pacta sunt servanda“) zu Grunde liegen und immer wieder zu Grund gelegt werden. Dabei werden sie in ihrer unerschütterlichen Gleichheit auf sehr andersartige Lebenswelten und Klassenlagen angewandt. Speziell für den Kreditvertrag macht der Aufsatz den Unterschied zwischen Darlehen zur Finanzierung von Kapitalinvestitionen und Darlehen zur Finanzierung des Konsums deutlich. Und dieser Unterschied und die enge Verbindung mit der Unsicherheit der Lohnabhängigen ist den Kreditgebern bewusst, geht auch in das Vertragsgeschehen, der unterschiedlichen Prüfung der Bonität und Sicherheiten etc. ein wie er auch einzelne Vertragsklauseln prägt. Am Ende steht dann die Verwandlung des schuldrechtlichen Prinzips „Geld muss man haben“ in „Arbeit/Arbeitseinkommen muss man haben“. Und letzteres ist eine kontrafaktische Annahme, die sich hinter den abstrakten vertragsrechtlichen Prinzipien verbirgt. Das ist mehr als eine oft notwendige, aber oft auch oberflächlich-beliebige Kritik der bürgerlichen Rechts-Ideologie, die damals bei linken Juristen (gerade auch in meinem Fach, dem Arbeitsrecht) sehr beliebt war. Von ihr muss man in einer Analyse der juristischen Methode wegkommen, einmal hin zur Kritik zentraler Vorverständnisse des Rechtssystems aber auch hin zu einem weiteren Schritt, der dann in der Arbeit Udo Reifners folgt: Die Erörterung der Frage welche Lösungen gibt es denn im bestehenden Rechtssystem und welche sollte man rechtspolitisch angehen?

Das ist der dritte wichtige, ungemein interessante aber auch kritisch zu diskutierende Aspekt dieser Arbeit. Sie entwickelt das Konzept einer „sozialen“ Interpretation der Darlehensverträge, die eng dem Vertragstext und dem Vertragsgeschehen folgt, also nichts Fremdes über den Vertrag stülpt, sondern zeigt, dass der Darlehensvertrag über das Geschehen beim Abschluss wie bis in seine Formulierungen hinein von dem Zusammenhang von Rückzahlung und Verfügung über Lohn/Gehalt abhängt. Sie ist notwendig, da sich hinter der abstrakten Natur der schriftlich „eindeutig“ von den Konsumenten unterzeichneten Vertragsklauseln, ja das einseitig von den Darlehensbanken auf- und durchgesetzte Vertragsformular verbirgt. Udo Reifner fasst die Auslegung dann in ganz gängige, aber mit einem anderen Verständnis ausgestattete Rechtsfiguren, der Geldschuld die (nur) in diesem Fall eine „Gattungs- und Vorratsschuld“ ist (d. h. nur aus dem laufenden, verfügbaren Einkommen, so vorhanden, zu begleichen ist). Da Arbeitslosigkeit nicht vom Arbeitnehmer verursacht ist, kann der Darlehensnehmer regelmäßig auf unverschuldeten Verzug und bei längerer Arbeitslosigkeit auf längeres unverschuldetes Unvermögen verweisen. In der Regel führt das zumindest zu einem Zahlungsaufschub von 2 und mehr Monaten.

Hier nun setzte und setzt auch heute noch die Diskussion und auch weiterführende Kritik an.

(1) Dieser Ansatz ist zwar auf Arbeitslosigkeit bezogen, er drängt aber wie jede juristische Argumentation dahin, auf der Ebene des Vertragsrechts verallgemeinert zu werden. Was sind die Grenzen? (a) Leicht bietet sich die Verallgemeinerung auf alle existentiellen Risiken an, die zwar durch das Sozialleistungssystem abgedeckt werden, aber immer zu einer sehr viel niedrigeren Quote als das vorherige Einkommen. Gilt diese Argumentation auch für den Fall, dass ein Ehepaar gemeinsam ein Konsumgut kreditfinanziert kauft und nur ein Partner mit seinem Einkommen wegen Arbeitslosigkeit aber auch Tod oder Unfall ausfällt und bei Rentnern in den damals üblichen Sparrunden die an sich fälligen Rentenerhöhungen gestrichen werden? (b) Wenn Geldschulden materialisiert und auf ihren sozioökonomischen Grund bezogen werden, um ihre sozial angemessene Abwicklung zu steuern, warum soll das nur bei Konsumentenkrediten von Arbeitnehmern bei Arbeitslosigkeit gelten und nicht auch bei einigen der vielen anderen vermachteten dauerhaften Vertragsbeziehungen (Miete; Versicherungsverträge) und mit welchen Konsequenzen?

(2) Auch in anderen Rechtsgebieten stoßen die allgemeinen Regeln des Zivilrechts auf ihre Grenzen, stiften keine auch nur halbwegs die Interessen beider Seiten berücksichtigende Lösung, sondern einseitig Unheil zu Lasten der ökonomisch Unterlegenen. Dies ist z. B. bei dem Annahmeverzug des Arbeitgebers, der seine Arbeitnehmer nicht beschäftigen kann/will, weil er aufgrund seiner hohen Verflechtung mit anderen Unternehmen, die bestreikt werden oder von Naturereignissen betroffen sind, seine Produkte nicht absetzen kann oder notwendige Zulieferungen nicht erhält. Hierfür gibt es spezielle Lösungen im Arbeits- und Sozialrecht. Wäre dann nicht auch statt einer Auflösung der allgemeinen Regeln der Schuldrechts spezielles Schutzrecht, nämlich Verbraucherschutzrecht bzw. Konsumentenkreditrecht mit klar umgrenzten Geltungsbereich und Problemlagen angemessener? Hätte das nicht den Vorteil, die formelle Rationalität des allgemeinen Zivilrechts unangetastet zu lassen. Oder wäre das nicht eher ein Nachteil, weil sich unter veränderten Bedingungen doch immer wieder die Logik des allgemeinen Zivilrechts, die Logik des sozial blinden Warentauschs durchsetzt?

Udo Reifner hat alle diese Probleme schon damals und dann später immer wieder wissenschaftlich scharf und praktisch fruchtbar analysiert und ist auch selbst verbraucherpolitisch sehr aktiv geworden, bis hin zur Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie der EG/EU und dem deutschen Verbraucherkreditgesetz, die beide aber die hier behandelten Probleme gerade nicht angehen. Eine dogmatisch-methodische Reflektion auf eine soziale Interpretation des Zivilrechts bleibt also notwendig.

Die Schwäche dieses Artikels ist es deshalb nur, seine Lösung nicht am Schluss einzuordnen und zu relativieren bzw. andere Lösungen kurz anzusprechen. Nur ist das zugleich auch eine Stärke dieses Artikels, sich nicht auf dies einerseits-andererseits einzulassen, sondern die herrschende Dogmatik auf den Prüfstand zu stellen, ihre Einseitigkeit und Blindheit anzugehen und sie weiter zu entwickeln. Die soziale Ausgestaltung langwährender Vertragsbeziehungen, die eine wichtige Lebensressource den Zwängen der Kapitalverwertung anderer unterwirft wie auch die Re-Materialisierung der abstraktesten ökonomischen Mittel von Geld und Kredit und der auf sie bezogenen juristischen Dogmatik und soziokulturellen Semantik und Grammatik des Kapitalismus bleiben ein notwendiges und schwieriges Geschäft. Für den Wissenschaftler Udo Reifner (und die vielen, mit denen er kooperiert hat) ein Lebenswerk, voller Hoffnungen und Mühen und vielen gelungenen Meisterstücken.

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Der Beitrag Arbeitslosigkeit verschuldeter Verbraucher erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

von Luca Nogler

“Wer nie die Dauer erfuhr, hat nicht gelebt” (Peter Handke, Gedicht an die Dauer)

La pubblicazione dei Principi sui contratti “di durata” per l’esistenza della persona fu pensata al fine di allargare il dibattito sul loro contenuto. Fin dall’uscita del libro sui Life time contracts eravamo, in altre parole consapevoli – ed anzi auspicammo come fortemente desiderabile – che essi avrebbero subito in futuro ulteriori modifiche, a partire, appunto, da quelle sollecitate dal dibattito scientifico. Vorrei proporre ad Udo Reifner, una breve agenda su due punti: le possibili modifiche ed integrazioni ai Principles ed il metodo per ripartire/rilanciare un gruppo di lavoro sui LTC.

•••

1.

Un primo punto meritevole di attenzione mi pare che sia emerso in uno degli ultimi incontri annuale dell’IFF di Hamburg, nella tavola rotonda alla quale parteciparono anche C. Schmidt e U. Fischer: a differenza dei contratti di lavoro, i contratti di credito al consumo sono sempre contratti a termine; lo stesso avviene spesso per l’affitto dell’immobile ad uso abitativo. Anche molti contratti di lavoro, anzi la maggior parte di quelli che riguardano i nuovi assunti, sono contratti di lavoro a termine (K. Auspurg, S. Gundert, Precarious Employment and Bargaining Power, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 2015, 2, 99 ss.). Abbiamo, quindi, bisogno di un principio ad hoc. I possibili quesiti sono: A) ha senso, come ha fatto in certi periodi il diritto del lavoro, prevedere una regola generale che consente di concludere il contratto con un termine solo in determinate ipotesi (ad esempio, per i contratti di lavoro per le attività stagionali o nei periodi di punte di shopping)? B) Ha senso prevedere che il termine abbia una durata minima; C) Ha senso affermare che il recesso ante tempus è possibile solo in presenza di una giusta causa o di un notevole inadempimento? Esistono sicuramente anche altri quesiti, ho cercato di formularne alcuni per iniziare la discussione.

2.

Hugh Collins nella sua recensione al volume, ha evidenziato che non abbiamo specificato se i nostri principi sono o no inderogabili. E’ meglio scrivere un principio che lo affermi in modo esplicito. Quesito: si può prevedere che per alcuni principi l’inderogabilità sia solo in peius (principio n. 11) e quindi siano possibili accordi migliorativi?

3.

Una questione collegata all’inderogabilità, è quella relativa all’indisponibilità dei diritti che vengono riconosciuti dai principi. Interrogativi: gli atti di disposizione sono nulli o annullabili? Se sono annullabili, prevediamo un termine di decadenza? Il termine di decadenza può essere rispettato con una semplice atto stragiudiziale oppure è necessario ricorrere in giudizio?

4.

Dobbiamo porci il problema di dire qualcosa sui termini di decadenza e su quelli di prescrizione?

5.

Penso che si dovrebbe affrontare anche la questione della litigation e sorgono a tal proposito immediatamente molti interrogativi: A) mi sembra che meccanismi di previa conciliazione possano essere, e siano stati in varie esperienze nazionali, utili; B) l’atto di conciliazione dovrebbe poter disporre dei diritti altrimenti indisponibili; C) l’accesso alla giustizia statale dovrebbe essere caratterizzato da costi minimi e da poche formalità, esito ora facilitato dal processo telematico (v. in tema Corte di giustizia C-75/16: “la normativa nazionale non può imporre al consumatore che prenda parte ad una procedura Adr di essere assistito obbligatoriamente da un avvocato”); D) si dovrebbero prevedere azioni collettive.

6.

Il governo Trump ha abrogato il divieto delle clausole obbligatorie di arbitrato. Penso che noi dovremmo introdurre un tale divieto tra i principi, anche perché in alcuni Stati – sicuramente l’Italia – esso è considerato di rango costituzionale.

7.

Da più parti si sollecita una maggior precisione nell’indicazione di quali siano i beni e servizi primari richiamati nel principio n. 1. Muriel Fabre-Magnan sostiene la categoria dei contratti cruciali per la vita delle persone, ma non mi sembra un gran passo avanti nella direzione di una maggior precisione perché è una categoria che nasce con l’obiettivo di individuare gli scopi che deve perseguire il potere statale e, quindi, ad esempio, essendo impossibile prevedere un diritto al posto di lavoro mancherebbe uno dei beni che per noi è essenziale. Ulteriori quesiti: avrebbe senso ragionare su un elenco non tassativo e solo esemplificativo; questo consentirebbe ad esempio di includere anche i contratti di scambio tra servizi offerti dalle piattaforme digitali e dati personali di chi usufruisce dei servizi stessi. Martina Melcher nel suo libro sulle Dienstleistungen von Allgemeinen sembra sostenere che la categoria dei LTC potrebbe riassorbire quella che è oggetto del suo libro: è una tesi certamente criticabile ma anche meritevole di discussione.

8.

Il principio n. 4 andrebbe esteso. La giurisprudenza italiana si trova confrontata con casi in cui semplicissimi contratti di acquisto di autovetture sono collegati a contratti di finanziamento ed adotta soluzione che sono state censurate dalla stessa Corte di giustizia (c-509/07). Bisogna formulare il principio in modo regolativo e cioè tale che comprenda già questi casi e non limitarlo – come succede nella sua formulazione attuale – ad una funzione programmatica.

9.

In relazione al principio n. 8, mi chiedo se non si debba introdurre un obbligo da parte dei proprietari degli appartamenti di farne un uso socialmente responsabile con conseguenze sul piano della tassazione: a Trento il 37% degli immobili adibiti ad uso abitativo sono vuoti. In Germania secondo i dati del Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung la quota è intorno al 5% ma la gran parte non si trova nelle città. Cosa giustifica una differenza così grande?

10.

In relazione al principio n. 15, mi sono chiesto più volte se sono pensabili o no, alcuni principi sul diritto pubblico che dovrebbe integrare la disciplina privatistica auspicata nel principio 15 stesso. Al momento mi vengono in mente soprattutto questioni legate alla tassazione. Ad esempio, considerato che con la digitalizzazione le rendite da capitale aumentano molto di più dei redditi da lavoro non avrebbe senso prevedere il principio per cui le prime sono proporzionalmente tassate molto di più dei secondi? Molti Stati contemporanei sono incentrati sulla tassazione dei redditi da lavoro: non avrebbe molto più senso tassare maggiormente i consumi? In Italia si discute moltissimo sul reddito minimo garantito. Bisognerebbe chiedere Frey Nybergh di indicare qualcuno che possa riferire della sperimentazione che si sta svolgendo a tal proposito in Finlandia.

11.

Il principio n. 8 dovrebbe essere precisato. Quesiti: esplicitiamo che possono essere discriminazioni sia dirette che indirette? Specifichiamo che conta il comportamento oggettivo e non la volontà psicologica dell’agente? Prevediamo o no qualcosa in ordine alle prove, ad esempio, quelle statistiche? Ho letto che la Antidiskriminierungsstelle del Bund tedesco ha pubblicato nel dicembre scorso un documento in cui elencano tutti i servizi alla persona che hanno prezzi discriminatori. Forse ci siamo occupati troppo poco dei servizi alla persona, una parte dei quali fa senz’altro parte dei LTC. In Austria le associazioni di rappresentanza hanno elaborato listini collettivi di prezzi dei servizi di taglio dei capelli. Siamo nell’ambito dei LTC?

LTC e digitalizzazione. Le mansioni svolte dai lavoratori sono in modo crescente caratterizzate da un contenuto cognitivo (anni addietro ho provato ad introdurre il termine Lavoro mentefatturiero). Ciò significa che non sono più estranee alla sua vita o ai suoi desideri ma che questi ultimi alimentano l’attività lavorativa. Ciò è positivo tuttavia può essere fonte di sfruttamento come dimostra il fatto che cresce il lavoro gratuito. Si parla in modo crescente di salari rubati. Allo stesso modo, la vita diventa sempre più multitasking sicché si lavora di più a casa; lo stesso vale per la formazione sulla quale dobbiamo insistere di più (v. il contributo di Giulia Merlo al volume curato da Ratti): è necessario un principio apposito in tema di formazione, ma forse più in generale sulla distribuzione dei costi del tempo.

LTC ed economia dello spirito (cfr. Schirrmacher F. (2015), Der Geist in der Maschine – Digitale Intelligenz und die Ökonomie des Geistes, Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurter Allgemeine Buch). Esiste un contratto che si sta rapidissimamente diffondendo nell’inconsapevolezza spesso totale di chi lo concludere: v. il bel saggio di Metzger A. (2016), Dienst gegen Daten: Ein synallagmatischer Vertrag, AcP, 818 ss. Ritengo che questo contratto non debba essere vietato ma accuratamente curato perché ha in realtà ad oggetto la vendita di frammenti della personalità delle persone ed in quanto tale esso incide sull’idea stessa dei LTC che fanno leva sul tempo soggettivo. I LTC rendono possibile lo sviluppo dell’individualità; questi contratti remano nella direzione opposta. Oggi giorno i dati sono praticamente regalati ai colossi informatici che gestiscono i dati di miliardi di soggetti e che possono prevedere gli eventi più disparati (ne ha parlato recentemente Hal Varian capo economista di Google). E’ necessario rifletterci sopra.

•••

Veniamo ora al secondo punto: come far ripartire un gruppo sui LTC. Non mi soffermo sui problemi pratici, che potrebbero essere per il primo meeting gestito dalle dottorande dell’Università di Trento. Per il finanziamento si potrebbe pensare come in passato un mix tra finanziamento da progetto ed autofinanziamento delle spese di viaggio ed alloggio. In questa sede mi sta cuore soprattutto il metodo, anzi i due metodi di lavoro che considero più fruttuosi.

Il primo metodo prende le mosse dai diritti nazionali (tedesco, francese, italiano, spagnolo e portoghese).

Da sempre abbiamo auspicato che si formasse un gruppo ristretto che si occupa di specificare il principio n. 11. Sarebbe utilissimo se qualcuno tra gli studiosi più giovani facesse una ricerca sui casi concreti. Ad esempio: può una banca recedere dai contratti sulle pensioni integrative dette Riester richiamandosi al § 313 BGB (modificazione del sostrato economico del contratto) perché ha modificato il proprio sistema informatico? La Corte di appello di Brescia con la sentenza n. 34 del 2016 ha affrontato questa questione: il codice civile italiano prevede che per risolvere il contratto di somministrazione (nel caso di specie si trattava della fornitura del gas presso un edificio adibito ad abitazione) è richiesto un inadempimento di “notevole importanza”, può il regolamento per le attività di vendita del gas naturale distribuito a mezzo di rete urbana predisposto dall’autorità amministrativa indipendente sull’energia (Aeegsi) prevedere che la risoluzione possa scattare già ove l’importo del debito sia di entità inferiore o pari alla cauzione?

Ovviamente questo modo di procedere potrebbe essere replicato in relazione ad altri principi, a seconda delle persone che intendono lavorare sul progetto.

Ma diritto nazionale significa ormai anche crescente diritto legislativo. In Italia, si parla in relazione alla recente crisi finanziaria di diritto privato della crisi: si dovrebbero incentivare ricognizioni su tali interventi. Interessante è anche la legislazione successiva al terremoto che ha colpito nel 2016 130 comuni dell’Italia centrale. Sono state sospese le rate dei mutui e dei finanziamenti “relativi alla prima casa di abitazione inagibile o distrutta”; sono state sospese dal pagamento le bollette relative ai contratti di fornitura di luce, gas ed acqua.

Il diritto nazionale significa infine anche diritto di fonte collettiva citata nel principio n. 7. L’ABI ha concluso più volte negli anni scorsi durante la crisi un accordo collettivo con svariate associazioni di interessi per la sospensione dei ratei di finanziamento.

Il secondo metodo prende le mosse dal diritto eurounitario.

Reiner Schulze e Fryderyk Schulze hanno pubblicato la seconda edizione (2018) del loro European Contract Law (Nomos). Il libro parte dal presupposto che ha già in una prospettiva di diritto positivo, parti centrali del diritto privato dei contratti sia condizionato dal punto di vista delle regole di fondo dal diritto euro-unitario. Grande è il ruolo assunto dai contratti dei consumatori, scarso quello dedicato ai contratti di lavoro. Sappiamo poi che la montagna del diritto europeo dei contratti ha partorito il topolino su un modello opzionale della compravendita. Questi rilievi servono per dire che in realtà già esiste la possibilità di prospettare un diritto eurounitario sui LTC. Sono consapevole che la locazione ad uso abitativo non è oggetto del diritto eurounitario, ma è comunque vero che gli altri due contratti basici lo sono. Ecco dunque la proposta: bisognerebbe organizzare un convegno in cui si incaricano alcuni relatori da rileggere il diritto eurounitario (direttive e giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia) nella chiave del diritto del contratto di lavoro e del diritto dei contratti dei consumatori in entrambi i casi confrontando l’esito con la nostra proposta di principles sui LTC. Questi due gruppi tematici dovrebbero essere oggetto di discussione nel convegno e dar luogo alla prossima pubblicazione sul tema. L’associazione Henri Capitant ha avviato un progetto per l’elaborazione di un Codice europeo del diritto degli affari. Il mercato reclama sempre di più l’uniformazione delle regole e gli indirizzi della politica economica europea portata aventi dal Consiglio intergovernativo dei Ministri delle finanze costituiscono il motore dell’integrazione indiretta dei sistemi giuridici dell’Europa continentale.

L’ultimissima riflessione riguarda la ricerca interdisciplinare ed in particolare quella con gli economisti. Adair Turner e Susan Lund propongono di riflettere sul fatto che in tutte le principali economie il rapporto del debito-Pil è oggi sensibilmente più alto rispetto al 2007 e si chiedono che non sia necessaria “l’introduzione di contratti di mutuo che consentano una maggior condivisione del rischio tra debitori e creditori, sostanzialmente degli strumenti ibridi tra debito e capitale”. Ecco gli interlocutori giusti.

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Der Beitrag Principles of Life Time Contracts erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

by Alessandro Somma

I.

Siamo nel 2013, l’ultimo anno del secondo esecutivo presieduto da Angela Merkel, a capo di una coalizione di Cristianodemocratici, Cristianosociali e Liberali. È in questo frangente che il Parlamento tedesco discute di una riforma della disciplina dell’insolvenza con disposizioni dedicate anche ai consumatori, poi approvata come Gesetz zur Verkürzung des Restschuldbefreiungsverfahrens und zur Stärkung der Gläubigerrechte (del 15 luglio 2013). La riforma è voluta fortemente dai Liberali, qualificati da Udo Reifner come “il partito di chi possiede i soldi”, quindi il partito dei creditori, che li concedono in prestito a consumatori, imprese e Stati, ovviamente dietro il pagamento di interessi. I debitori dovrebbe essere considerati dei benefattori, dal momento che fanno fruttare somme di denaro altrimenti destinate a rappresentare una ricchezza inerte. E invece sono bistrattati dagli autori della riforma, tanto che per Reifner essa determina “un ritorno al principio del XIX secolo”.

A partire da questo episodio si sviluppano brevi ma incisive riflessioni che muovono dal senso del neoliberalismo in quanto attuale fondamento dello stare insieme come società, per poi considerare nel merito il ruolo del debito in quanto dispositivo biopolitico.

II.

Prima di entrare in dialogo con queste riflessioni vorrei sottolineare un pregio di questo scritto, in qualche modo amplificato dal suo essere concepito per una occasione ben precisa: una conferenza per un pubblico di persone più o meno esperte di indebitamento, ma non necessariamente in quanto giuristi. Di qui lo stile tendenzialmente divulgativo, che pure nulla toglie alla precisione e profondità del discorso, e soprattutto il ricorso ad immagini ed espressioni forti, pensate per impressionare l’ascoltatore prima e il lettore poi.

È uno stile poco utilizzato dai cultori del diritto, che di norma reputano il carattere scientifico di una trattazione compatibile unicamente con il ricorso a linguaggi paludati, a dimostrazioni in punta di penna, ad argomentazioni capaci di testimoniare l’incrollabile equilibrio di chi le propone. Come se il diritto fosse una scienza esatta, come se non coinvolgesse passioni ed emozioni al pari della politica, di cui costituisce del resto una diretta espressione.

Proprio questo viene invece occultato dal giurista, di norma intento a legittimare il proprio ruolo sfoggiando capacità innate di maneggiare un complesso di conoscenze tecniche, in quanto tale distante dall’arena politica. Salvo poi scoprire che, dopo aver contribuito a creare un clima di accettazione per la tecnocrazia, non è più lui il tecnocrate di moda. Questo ruolo, infatti, è stato usurpato dall’economista, dal quale il giurista non può fare altro che mutuare il linguaggio e le teorie sempre più indispensabili ad attribuire significato alle parole dei più disparati legislatori.

Se dunque vuole recuperare visibilità sulla scena del dibattito pubblico, il cultore del diritto deve ripoliticizzare il suo discorso, e deve farlo senza nascondere le passioni che questo comporta. E senza per questo rinunciare al carattere scientifico del suo argomentare, all’articolata dimostrazione delle tesi sostenute, dando così finalmente vita a un filone letterario che altri studiosi frequentano da tempo con successo: primo fra tutti Simon Springer con il suo “fotti il neoliberalismo“((Springer, Fuck Neoliberalism, in 15 International Journal for Critical Geographies, 2016, p. 285 ss. http://142.207.145.31/index.php/acme/article/download/1342/1172.)).

Il linguaggio di Reifner non è così colorito, ma non per questo è meno forte: stigmatizza fin dall’inizio il carattere autoritario del neoliberalismo ben esemplificato dalla nota ma poco evocata attività dei Chicago Boys nel Cile degli anni Settanta e Ottanta, ovvero “dall’accoppiata di Friedman e Pinochet”. E liquida il sistema del credito erogato dalle banche come “sfruttamento senza scrupoli dei più poveri sostenuto dalla legislazione europea”. Per poi concludere che ci troviamo in un conflitto tra classi, tuttavia non quelle identificate da Marx, ovvero i capitalisti e i lavoratori, bensì quelle cui prelude la distinzione di Engels e Kautsky tra persone a cui sono riconosciuti diritti e persone senza diritti: i creditori e i debitori.

III.

La classe dei creditori, chiosa Reifner, è la stessa degli “investitori”. Una classe che in effetti è collocata al centro dell’ordine economico di matrice neoliberale in quanto ordine incentrato sulla libera circolazione dei fattori produttivi: in particolare dei capitali. Se questi non hanno frontiere, allora gli Stati devono essere disposti a fare qualsiasi cosa per attirarli, ovvero per attirare investitori, a partire dall’abbassamento delle pressione fiscale sulle imprese e dalla svalutazione e precarizzazione del lavoro.

Prima non era così. Era diffusa l’idea che le merci dovessero circolare liberamente, ma si riteneva che lo stesso non valesse per i capitali: era questo il senso del cosiddetto compromesso di Bretton Woods, così denominato perché raggiunto in occasione della celeberrima conferenza tenutasi presso l’omonima cittadina sul finire del primo conflitto mondiale. In quell’occasione si affermò solennemente che occorreva combattere la disoccupazione rivitalizzando il commercio internazionale, se del caso fornendo capitali ai Paesi bisognosi attraverso una Banca mondiale. La libera circolazione dei capitali avrebbe invece rappresentato una minaccia((Cfr. M. Morgenthau, Closing Address to the Conference, in International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Articles of Agreement, Washington, U.S. Treasury, 1944, p. iv.)), tanto che nello Statuto del Fondo monetario internazionale si dice esplicitamente che “gli Stati membri possono esercitare gli opportuni controlli per regolamentare i movimenti di capitali” (art. vi).

Il neoliberalismo incide profondamente su questo assetto. Del resto si è affermato nel corso degli anni Ottanta per rovesciare lo schema alla base dei cosiddetti Trenta gloriosi, pensato per tenere insieme crescita e occupazione: lo schema alla base della spirale virtuosa originata dal potere contrattuale dei lavoratori, produttiva di una buona crescita dei livelli salariali, a sua volta motore per l’incremento dei consumi, e quindi dell’occupazione e della forza dei lavoratori. Evidentemente gli effetti della libera circolazione dei capitali avrebbero inceppato un sistema incentrato sul sostegno della domanda, alimentato anche dalla redistribuzione della ricchezza realizzata dalle strutture dello Stato sociale: il rovesciamento del compromesso di Bretton Woods e l’affossamento del compromesso keynesiano sono le due facce della stessa medaglia.

IV.

L’interesse per il contributo di Reifner non risiede solo nell’indicazione degli investitori, ovvero dei creditori, quali tipi umani di riferimento per l’edificazione e lo sviluppo del neoliberalismo. Particolarmente apprezzabile è anche l’individuazione delle dinamiche intimamente biopolitiche che sostengono un simile sviluppo, del resto ben esemplificate dall’espressione tedesca Schuld: che in italiano, e in diverse altre lingue, significa sia “debito”, sia “colpa”.

Reifner sottolinea come questa identificazione sia funzionale “a una sfrenata globalizzazione del modo di pensare capitalista”. Produce infatti “una buona morale dei pagamenti”, e con ciò “il radicamento in noi di una prigione che ci siamo scelti”, utilizzata tuttavia per legittimare gli attacchi, anzi le bastonate ai debitori insolventi: il Schuldnerbashing. Tutto questo mentre soprattutto i politici neoliberali mostrano atteggiamenti di tutt’altro tipo nei confronti di chi possiede ingenti somme di denaro, quindi dei creditori, spesso e volentieri protetti con il segreto bancario. Più precisamente: mano pesante con una categoria composta nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi da disoccupati o comunque caduti in disgrazia per motivi a loro non imputabili, e mano di velluto con “gli investitori, i fondi speculativi, gli strozzini”. E si potrebbe aggiungere: mano pesante anche contro i creditori socialmente deboli, se è vero che i mitici Rapporti Doing business della Banca mondiale, catalizzatori di riforme in linea con l’ortodossia neoliberale, sponsorizzano l’abbandono della categoria dei creditori privilegiati: in massima parte lavoratori rimasti senza stipendio nel periodo precedente il fallimento del datore di lavoro((A. Somma, Giustizia o pacificazione sociale? La codeterminazione nello scontro tra modelli di capitalismo, in Politica del diritto, 2015, p. 549 ss.)).

Ovviamente non è sempre stato così, e anzi l’osservazione storica mostra che la remissione dei debiti ha una lunga tradizione((A.D. Manfredini, Rimetti a noi i nostri debiti. Forme della remissione del debito dall’antichità all’esperienza europea contemporanea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2013.)). È cioè tipico del neoliberalismo utilizzare il debito come strumento attraverso cui produrre e governare le soggettività individuali, ma anche quelle collettive((M. Lazzarato, La fabbrica dell’uomo indebitato. Saggio sulla condizione neoliberista, Roma, DeriveApprodi, 2012.)).

Lo si ricava al meglio osservando le correnti modalità con cui si procede allo sviluppo della costruzione europea: la stigmatizzazione del debito sovrano al solo fine di imporre forme di assistenza finanziaria condizionate all’adozione di specifiche riforme strutturali. Il tutto alla base di una vera e propria economia del debito, tale in quanto fondata su rapporti che, diversamente dalle relazioni di scambio, sono anche formalmente instaurate tra soggetti impari. Di qui la particolare radicalità delle riforme, che nel disprezzo delle più elementari regole democratiche determinano una contrazione della spesa sociale, la privatizzazione del patrimonio pubblico, la liberalizzazione dei servizi locali e la riduzione delle relazioni di lavoro a relazioni di mercato qualsiasi((A. Somma, The Biopolitics of Debt-Economy. Market Order, Ascetic and Hedonist Morality, in B. Keller, A. Somma, P. Zumbansen (a cura di), Reshaping Markets. Economic Governance, the Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 115 ss.)).

V.

Come precisato da Reifner, il denaro dato a prestito si iscrive in un rapporto che dal punto di vista del senso economico dell’operazione ben può essere qualificata come locazione di denaro. Di qui lo specifico interesse del creditore non tanto alla restituzione della somma, bensì a percepire gli interessi il più possibile elevati, soprattutto per un tempo il più esteso possibile.

Questo schema è applicato con particolare accanimento nei confronti dei debitori sovrani, il cui comportamento è anch’esso plasmato dai canoni della moralità in linea con l’economia del debito: quella per cui prevale l’obbligo di ripagare il debito su tutti gli altri obblighi incombenti sull’ente pubblico, innanzi tutto quello di assicurare il godimento dei diritti fondamentali.

A questi aspetti si è dedicato il Rapporto sulla riforma del sistema monetario e finanziario internazionale predisposto nell’ambito delle Nazioni Unite da una commissione presieduta da Joseph Stiglitz((United Nations, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nation General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System del 21 settembre 2009, www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf, p. 121 ss.)). Lì si affronta l’essenza dell’economia del debito: l’assoggettamento incondizionato del Paese debitore alla volontà dei creditori più forti e spregiudicati, che può essere efficacemente contrastato solo interrompendo la spirale dell’indebitamento: con l’insolvenza sovrana. Il tutto, però, solo se si abbandona l’attuale modo di gestirla((Su cui C. Paulus, A Resolvency Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns, in 3 International Insolvency Law Review, 2012, p. 1 ss.)), se si adottano cioè procedure partecipate in cui siano previsti audit pubblici, ritenuti la modalità principe con cui ottenere “una ristrutturazione trasparente ed equa del debito, ed eventualmente una sua cancellazione”.

Il tema dell’equità, accanto a quello della trasparenza, è un punto centrale nel Rapporto Stiglitz, dove si stigmatizzano gli effetti che il modo attuale di affrontare il debito sovrano produce in particolare sul sistema dei diritti sociali: le politiche di austerità imposte dal servizio del debito violano “i diritti dei cittadini comuni, cioè i diritti all’istruzione, alla salute e alla pensione”. Ma è proprio questo ciò che accade nel momento in cui si condiziona la concessione di prestiti al rovesciamento del compromesso keynesiano((T. Mahmud, Is it Greek or déjà vu all over again? Neoliberalism and Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, in 52 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2011, p. 629 ss.)), che ancora una volta si conferma essere l’obiettivo primo dell’ortodossia neoliberale.

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Der Beitrag Biopolitica ed economia del debito erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

Der Beitrag Ökonomie des Geldes – Kooperation und Akkumulation erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

by Damon Gibbons

In November 2008, at the peak of the financial crisis, and only a month after the British Government had bailed out three of the UK’s largest banks, HM Queen Elizabeth II visited the London School of Economics. Whilst there she famously asked((‘The Queen asks why no one saw the credit crunch coming’, Daily Telegraph, 5^th November 2008.)) the academics present why no-one had seen the crisis coming? After pondering this question for a period of eight months, a formal response was eventually delivered by some of the nation’s most respectable economists to the Royal Household. Its analysis concluded((Cited in Gordon, J. (). ‘On the role of the actuary in a changing world’. Dolman Scott Ltd. )):

“In summary, your Majesty, the failure to forsee the timing, extent and severity, and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people…”

Perhaps then, one of the lessons from the crisis is that the British intelligentsia, as well as the very bright people in charge of global financial institutions, the central banks, and the regulators should, in future, make more of an effort to listen to those providing critiques of neo-liberalism rather than its cheerleaders?

It was certainly not the case that no-one understood the dangers of credit market liberalisation. From 2005 onwards, Udo devoted his considerable energies to providing a comprehensive critique of these. Bringing together critical voices ranging across numerous academic disciplines, consumer groups, and, in some cases, from within the financial sector itself, Udo was the driving force behind the creation of the European Coalition for Responsible Credit (‘ECRC’). He also made an immense intellectual contribution to the positions that the ECRC adopted. Distilling his vast knowledge of the history, ethics, and the legal foundations of credit use in society, Udo drafted and promoted the seven Principles of Responsible Credit, which some thirteen years later remain a lodestone for those of us who can imagine and seek to ensure a more productive, ethical, and effective financial services system.

For me, one of the finest expositions of Udo’s thought – revealing the detailed socio-legal analysis which underpin the Principles – is his Chapter ‘Responsible Credit in the EU: National Law, the New EU-Directive and Beyond’, which was published in a collection of papers seeking to understand the impact of consumer credit regulation on economic activity((In Delia, E.P, ed (2007) ‘Evolving Legislation on Consumer Credit and Trade Practices: Stimulus or Drag on Economic Activity?’.)) in 2007.

The chapter begins by recognising that the neo-liberal approach to credit regulation was being exported from the US (and inevitably therefore the UK) into European markets with a resulting deterioration in the types of financial services products being offered to consumers. Usurious prices ‘disguised as risk based pricing’; the cross-selling of useless insurances, and the constant flipping of credit agreements into long term revolving debt obligations were the main results. But it is Udo’s summary of the policy narrative behind the process of market liberalisation which particularly catches the attention in his introduction (p.54):

“Claiming that everybody should have access to credit, the quality of credit products is increasingly freed from all cultural rules that historically defined consumer debts as a dangerous product. More access will lead to more competition and cut prices so that ‘the consumer’ will profit. This is the neo-liberal message from DG Market in Brussels.”

The proposition of universal access to credit is rightly to be considered preposterous if one simultaneously removes controls over pricing and relies only on consumers being properly informed about the content of agreements for their protection. Udo was clear: providing credit at extortionate prices to the poorest was driving them further into poverty and creating ‘social losses’ – or, for me, what could be termed economic externalities: for example in the form of mental and physical health problems or increased homelessness.

Udo’s chapter therefore rightly focused on defending the historical protections that had been put in place in Europe and which were being threatened by the European Commission’s acquiescence to neo-liberal ideology (p.56):

…continental Europe has still a rich and active history of protection against usurious credit practices which are not limited to interest rates. It is mostly not part of the consumer credit legislation which followed the first EU Consumer Credit Directive but is part of the tradition of civil law with its rules on bona fide and good morals, on anatocism, default interest, early repayment, improvident credit extension and limits to usurious refinancing practices. This legislation still in force starts from the assumption that for ordinary people less debt is better than much debt and that debt which does not represent actual investments is dangerous for people and families.”

At the time of writing, Udo, and the ECRC he founded, sought to defend these types of protections across continental Europe by calling for a ‘Responsible Lending’ principle within what was to become the Consumer Credit Directive of 2008. However, the Commission could not be persuaded on this point. In the end the Directive would contain nothing more than a requirement for Member States to ensure lenders assessed the ‘creditworthiness’ of applicants – for example by calculating credit scores based on the information held by credit reference agencies. Quite rightly, Udo identified that this process achieved the precise opposite of what was actually needed because it enabled lenders to segment for their perceived risk, and to price accordingly (p.58):

“The scores derived from those data bases for each household increasingly are not the basis for credit denial but more for the higher prices for poorer clients in risk based credit pricing systems. It thus achieves the opposite: the debt burden of the overindebted is higher with than without ‘responsible lending’ which leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy: higher risk equal higher cost, equal an increased debt burden which again increases overindebtedness.”

We now know, of course, that the expansion of credit data, ever increasing market segmentation, and risk based pricing are the key ingredients in the development of sub-prime markets and create considerable instability in the financial system – especially when portfolios of sub-prime loans are bundled up as investment opportunities through the process of securitisation. But even in 2007 and 2008, with the causes of the financial crisis coming into view, policy makers held to the ridiculous notion that lenders would use information positively to make responsible lending decisions of their own accord, and that formal requirements in this respect were not necessary.

Importantly the concept of Responsible Lending, as articulated by Udo, covers not only the decision to lend, but also the subsequent adaptation of credit agreements in the face of changes in the circumstances experienced by borrower. This is critical as a means of protecting people from exploitation and preventing overindebtedness (p.60):

“[Responsible Lending] is not only a principle which intends to prevent unconscious borrowing (and lending) but it wants to adapt credit to the needs and social circumstances of consumers to make render it productive for them. Thus national regulations incorporate the wisdom of several thousand years in handling personal debts when they for example limit anatocism fix interest rate ceilings and regulate duties to care for the families and their living conditions if credit turns from a promising investment into mere debt.”

The chapter goes on to detail the many different laws and regulations in place in countries across Europe which could, if drawn together into a cohesive package, form the basis of a pan-European Responsible Lending Directive. The level of detail in the chapter, which includes not only the specific laws and regulations, but in many cases also discusses their historical development and the legal and ethical principles contained within them, is considerable. This was a typical feature of Udo’s work and is of great and lasting value. There is not space here to comment on the many individual ‘best practices’ which the chapter highlights. However, the natural end point of the chapter is set out in the Principles for Responsible Credit, and specifically in Principle 3: ‘Lending has at all times to be cautious, responsible and fair’, which includes (p.91) the following:

“There needs to be a social guarantee that lenders will not abuse their position when the borrowers circumstances worsen through no fault of their own. In these circumstances lenders should not be able to seek higher charges on default or to worsen the position of the borrower further. There also needs to be a more sophisticated understanding of risk and a proper consideration of risk across the credit portfolio rather than an attempt to identify an individual risk based price for each and every social group.”

For me, writing this review in 2018, it is clear that the distribution of risk amongst society lies at the heart of our continuing problems in the ‘post-financial crisis’ period. Our economies are held back by considerable debt overhangs. The burden of repayments are concentrated in low to middle income groups, who, particularly here in the UK, have also been faced with a cost of living crisis. Individual risk based pricing penalises these groups – they become higher risk as their financial circumstances worsen. Social, or ‘solidarity’, pricing as Udo once called it, urgently needs to be adopted as a fairer, more responsible, and more stable, alternative.

Achieving this, and in the process reimagining a credit society which is productive, responsible, and socially just, is an immensely difficult task. We will need to use our collective imaginations and engage in discussion with those eminent economists and the very bright people in global finance, central banks and regulatory institutions, who have not been particularly open to criticism in the past. The door is even now only half open. When we do talk to them, it will serve us well to have Udo’s words in our minds.

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Der Beitrag Responsible Credit in the EU erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..

Der Beitrag Udo Reifner – Standing firm erschien zuerst auf iff | institut für finanzdienstleistungen e.V..